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One important element of a reliabilist account of knowl-
edge is the causal production of beliefs about the external 
world. If such beliefs are thus produced they are likely to 
be true. This is a strategy that is not available to internal-
ism. A strong link to Humean accounts of causation may 
be implicit in internalist doctrines about justification since 
they seem to assume the impossibility of justified beliefs 
about genuine causal facts. But if it can be shown that 
beliefs about causal facts are justifiable in the internalist 
sense then this would decisively modify the unsatisfying 
position of internalism regarding knowledge about the 
external world. It will be argued that knowledge presup-
poses doxastic change and that (i) beliefs about doxastic 
change are indefeasibly justifiable, that (ii) such change is 
not itself a doxastic entity, and (iii) that it involves causal 
facts. 
The argument against scepticism then turns on the 
possibility of knowledge about doxastic change, where the 
latter is construed as a non-doxastic, i.e. an "external" 
entity – and where "external" is intended to refer to an 
extended mental domain. This argument plus the intuition 
about the causal constitution of somatic experience are 
supposed to render the standard external world hypothesis 
more plausible relative to its sceptical alternatives. 
Introduction 
Epistemological internalism tells us that justification as 
such is essentially an inferential relation between doxa in a 
doxastic system. Coherentism, one internalist variant, 
assumes that this is all there is to justification and its role 
regarding propositional knowledge: all doxa are equal in 
principle regarding their possible justificatory status; foun-
dationalism, the other internalist (and classical rationalist) 
option, admits of foundational doxa that somehow ground 
a doxastic system, e.g. perceptual beliefs (Bonjour 1985). 
Internalism is compatible with naturalism where the causal 
production or change of beliefs is admitted. But causal 
matters can only enter into an explanation of knowledge 
and not into its justificatory aspects (Davidson 1984). 
There seems to be a close relationship between a Hume-
an account of causation and internalism. If causation is 
seen as a mere constant conjunction of similar facts in-
stead of a genuine relation between certain types of relata 
then causal facts are unable to have any special role in the 
production of knowledge. On this account causes and 
effects cannot be perceived as such and beliefs about 
causal facts supervene on the beliefs about the experience 
of regularities. Could internalism profit from realist ac-
counts of causation or are such accounts reserved for 
externalists? 
The conceptual separation of justification from explana-
tion in internalism makes this doctrine attractive and 
vulnerable at once. The attribution of truth-conductivity to 
justification is attractive since it makes justification relevant 
in the evaluation of knowledge claims. Since this attribu-
tion is further linked to criteria regarding the permissibility 
of justification (direct epistemic access to justifiers as well 
as to criteria), internalism is a complete account of 
epistemic justification. An important problem that derives 
from this attribution is the question of how beliefs about 
non-doxastic things are justifiable. Put more to the point, 
how can it be that beliefs about external things could 
become justified without external justifiers and their 
relevant connection to the domain of doxa? 
Epistemological externalism gets much of its persua-
siveness from this relative weakness of internalism 
(Armstrong 1973; Dretske 1981; Plantinga 1993a). After 
all, beliefs are seen as intentional objects and how could 
beliefs ever change or new beliefs be produced if all they 
ever did were to exclusively point logically to other, even 
foundational, beliefs? Externalism has thus abandoned the 
essential connection between justification and truth-
conductivity in contending that it is not justification but the 
process by which a belief has been generated that is 
primarily truth-conducive. If it is a reliable process it will be 
truth-conducive and vice versa. But this is done at the cost 
of being unable to name general conditions of the reliability 
of some such process. Consequently, reliabilism is seen 
as an account of a concept of knowledge (true belief, 
produced by a reliable process) rather than as an account 
of justification. On the other hand, externalism is strong 
where it involves important and basic intuitions about the 
constitution of our knowledge. We tend to think of the 
causal aspects of belief production or belief change as 
somehow bearing on the justifiability of knowledge 
(Dretske 1969, Goldman 1979, Plantinga 1993a, 1993b). 
But this, too, presupposes that the causal (i.e. external) 
facts involved in the production of reliable beliefs are 
knowable. 
1. An argument from doxastic change 
All human knowledge production essentially involves 
doxastic change. I contend that beliefs can be formed 
about such change. If there is a doxastic change d and a 
corresponding belief pd ('d has occurred') then pd will be 
indefeasibly justified by doxastic change d iff pd is about d 
since d and pd both are directly epistemically accessible. I 
contend, therefore, that pd will be indefeasible because it 
would be impossible to obtain evidence to the effect that pd 
is false. (It should additionally be possible to construe an 
account of a belief about doxastic change to involve 
properties of d, e.g. qd 'd involves perception v and 
inference s'.) 
The next step towards the argument from doxastic 
change is an ontological interpretation of doxa as opposed 
to doxastic change. I propose that doxa and doxastic 
changes belong to different and non-overlapping sub-
classes of mental entities each. They are, so to speak, 
external relative to each other. This is so because doxastic 
changes as such – in contradistinction to doxa – necessar-
ily involve causes and effects (whatever the exact 
character of the latter may be). It is important to note that 
this construal of doxastic change can remain unchanged in 
all hypothetical frameworks regarding the "external world" 
– whether this be a standard natural world, a world of 
minds controlled by a génie malin or a supercomputer, or 
simply the environment of a self-organizing system. 
With a concept of justified beliefs regarding doxastic 
change and an ontological interpretation of doxa and 
doxastic change, the argument (DC) now runs as follows. 
(1)  Doxastic changes are non-doxastic entities. 




(2)  There are indefeasible, justified beliefs (doxa)  
about doxastic changes. 
(3)  There are indefeasible, justified beliefs about 
non-doxastic entities. 
I now want to suggest that (DC) renders an initial plausibil-
ity to the claim that there are justified perceptual beliefs 
regarding an external world. The plausibility in this case is 
derived from (DC) in that the latter demonstrates that there 
is knowledge about non-doxastic entities. This initial 
plausibility for the claim that there are justified perceptual 
beliefs regarding an external world needs further support. I 
will argue that beliefs about doxastic change are percep-
tual beliefs. 
2. Perceptual beliefs and doxastic change 
What seems awkward in the internalist picture of knowl-
edge is that it is a static picture of doxastic systems that 
corresponds badly to our intuitions. If only doxa and the 
logical relations between them can contribute to the 
justification of beliefs how is genuine change in a doxastic 
system to be explained? It seems to me that if something 
genuinely changes in a doxastic system (e.g. a new belief 
is formed) then an epistemic agent can have non-
inferential knowledge both of the fact of change as well as 
knowledge about this new belief (e.g. that it was produced 
in the course of this change). Good examples for this are 
subjective somatic perceptions which illustrate the point 
about an intrinsic connection between doxastic change 
and the corresponding perceptual experience. 
Strolling out in the green in spring is relaxing because, 
among other things, the air is fresh and there are lots of 
agreeable smells in it. The sudden appearance of a 
characteristic foul smell under such circumstances will 
cause a focusing of ones attention. A series of doxastic 
changes occurrs that may result in one searching for the 
source of the smell. Maybe one finds a dead animal 
beneath a tree stump and further doxastic changes occur. 
I suggest that one can have non-inferential knowledge of 
these changes as well as of the particular things that 
caused them (smells, views etc.). 
When I ride a bicycle I continuously balance out the 
movements of my body mass in order to ride smoothly. 
After a little practice it is easy for me to ride thus with no 
hands. One day it appears that the balance doesn't work 
and the bike is not following lead. Again, several doxastic 
changes occur instantly and noninferentially and eventu-
ally the belief is (inferentially) formed that the bike is 
oversteering by itself. A visual check shows that the back 
wheel is tilted out of its correct axis. It is adjusted and the 
ride continues smoothly, with several doxastic changes 
following swiftly from my somatic perception that there is 
proper balance again. 
To my mind, such examples show it to be a compelling 
intuition that I am in fact able not only to inferentially 
interpret all these doxastic incidents as connected, 
complex causal chains but that in the singular case of an 
event in the system of doxa I am able to perceive that this 
is an instance of a singular causal relation. The experience 
of smelling something new (construed as the experience of 
a doxastic change of a certain kind) seems to me to be 
able to ground the possibility of non-inferential knowledge 
about causal facts involved in the event of this change. 
Beliefs of this sort cannot exclusively be justified by other 
doxa because if a change occurred then something non-
inferential and non-doxastic has happenend to this 
doxastic system. Hence the suggestion that doxastic 
change is perceivable and that beliefs about such change 
are beliefs about a special kind of perceptual experience. 
If beliefs about causal facts were reducible to beliefs 
about the constant conjunction of similar things (as in 
Humean causation) then there would be no interesting 
interpretation of these examples. The compelling intuition 
that, in cases such as these, causes and effects (qua 
chains of doxastic change incidents) are indeed perceived 
would have to remain unanswered. A realist account about 
singular causation explains this intuition and thus 
contributes positively to the respective account about 
beliefs formed on perceptual experience. (Maybe it is 
precisely such kinds of perceptual and doxastic incidents 
that are basic for the formation of any concept of causa-
tion. In other words, when we talk of causes and effects 
and their intrinsic connection we mean types of things that 
are similar to the types of things that I have just mentioned. 
But I am not suggesting that this could be a substantial 
account of singular causation; cf. Fales 1990, Tooley 
1990).  
3. The case against Cartesian Scepticism 
Provided a realist account of singular causation, since 
doxastic change involves causal facts it is plausible to 
assume that non-inferential knowledge about causal facts 
is possible. But knowledge about causal facts is knowl-
edge about the external world. Now, doxastic change 
could either be a somatic entity, or a mental entity, or it 
could represent some sort of interface between the mental 
and the somatic. I am uncertain about these options but I 
want to suggest that it is enough to assume that doxastic 
change is external in the sense of being non-doxastic to 
increase the plausibility of the external world hypothesis. 
A classical but flawed treatment of the question about the 
external world is this: 
(1)  There is (non-inferential and fallible) knowledge 
about sense experience. 
(2)  The object of sense experience is the external 
world. 
(3)  There is (non-inferential and fallible) knowledge 
about the external world. 
Conclusion (3) is problematic mainly because premise (2) 
is problematic. The internalist argument from doxastic 
change in sec. 1 above connected to an externalist, 
reliabilist epistemological scheme in sec. 2 facilitates a 
reworking of the above argument. I suggested that we 
view doxastic change as an entity that is itself not a 
doxastic entity and that it incorporates causal facts. I 
further suggested that there are indefeasibly justified 
beliefs about doxastic change. Furthermore, justification of 
such beliefs is conferred through the perception of such 
facts. The reworking of the argument above will thus be: 
(1*)  There are indefeasible and non-inferential beliefs 
about doxastic change. 
(2*)  Doxastic change is part of the non-doxastic 
world. 
(3*)  There are indefeasible and non-inferential beliefs 
about the non-doxastic world. 
The examples in sec. 2 all involve perceptual experience 
and I have tried to illustrate how such experience – qua 
experience of doxastic change – can have justificatory 
force for the corresponding perceptual beliefs. But these 




and other examples show something more than the 
existence of justified beliefs about singular causation. 
Perceptual experience delivers a wide range of qualities 
and we are able to respond to these diverse inputs in a 
corresponding wide range of behavioral options. If we 
were brains-in-vats or something similar then the super-
computer would not only have to deliver the impressions 
we have of the world as passive perceivers but it would 
have to tackle all the contingencies that continuously occur 
originating from our behavioral repertoire and, additionally, 
the corresponding perceptual experiences that result from 
our illusionary interventions in the non-existent standard 
external world. I conclude that, since it is plausible to 
regard doxastic change as a subclass of the class of 
entities of the external world, and since causal facts and 
other qualities are putatively involved in beliefs about such 
entities, knowledge about doxastic change is substantial 
knowledge about aspects of an external world. 
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